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Becoming ‘Holistically Indigenous’: Young Muslims and Political 
Participation in Canada 
 
______________________________________________ 
PAUL NESBITT LARKING and KATHY BULLOCK 
 
Abstract 
 
While media and the government often focus on the supposed ‘radicalisation’ of 
Muslim youth in Canada, our research explores the more complicated and 
nuanced political identities of twenty young Canadian Muslims. Using semi-
structured in-depth interviews with these youth in the Greater Toronto Area 
(GTA) and London, Ontario, we explore these young citizen’s concepts of 
political participation, conceptions of the self as a political actor, formal, 
informal and civic political involvement, and the relationship between their 
religious and Canadian identities. Our research is grounded in a positive and 
pluralistic politics of care, respect, and engagement. We treated Muslim youth as 
similar to other Canadian youth and designed our study guided by other 
contemporary research into Canadian youth and political participation. While 
our interviewees noted the impact of negative public discourse about Muslims and 
some experiences of racism, the research results revealed an overwhelming 
commitment to Canada and political engagement, evidenced most fully by a high 
level of civic engagement. 
 
Introduction 
 
On April 12th 2012, Tarek Mehanna, twenty-nine years old and a US citizen, was convicted for 
seventeen and a half years for material support of terrorism.  Newspaper reports, along with the 
prosecution, outlined a transitional movement of “radicalisation” from “American” to “Al Qaeda 
supporter.”1  At the same time, twenty-six year old Canadian Omar Khadr, held in the 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp since 2002, petitioned the Canadian government to serve the 
remainder of his jail term in Canada.  Referring to him as one of Canada’s “most notorious 
citizens,”2 The Globe and Mail presented Khadr as another youth “radicalised” by Islamic 
extremism.  Mehanna and Khadr represent the common discourse through which the media, the 
state (notably the security apparatus), and the general public construct Muslim youth in North 
America today: alienated and vulnerable to “radicalisation” and anti-Western messages of 
“extremist” imams and community leaders.3 
The Canadian media have sensationalised stories of those few Muslim youths who have 
chosen violence,4 implicating them under the more general and historic orientalist theme of 
“Muslims as barbarians.”5 Equally disturbing is the ease with which the Canadian government 
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has adopted a similar paradigm, viewing Muslim religiosity through the lenses of 
“radicalisation,” hence a potential threat to Canada.6  This was implied in a public lecture by 
Andrew Ellis, director general of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for Toronto, 
in which he stated that in his interviews with young Canadian Muslims he is often told “I can’t 
participate in the political process because it’s against my religion.”7  
But how much do we really know about the relationship of Canadian Muslim youths to 
the Canadian political community?  Should the perspective of Ellis’s interviewees be generalised 
to become the foundation of a government policy that considers religious orthodoxy as part of a 
“conveyor belt” to terrorism?8  It is our argument that it should not.  While there has been almost 
no research on the political participation of Canadian Muslim youth, (indeed Canadian Muslims 
in general),9  sociological research on other aspects of Canadian Muslim youth identity, (social, 
cultural citizenship, education),10 leads to data suggesting a more complex and complicated 
relationship of youth to religion and their Canadian communities than the simplistic one 
operationalized in government circles.    
 Notwithstanding the importance of their cases, this article is not about Mehanna or 
Khadr; nor is it about any other Muslim youth, who engage in violent acts in the name of Islam.  
It is an exploration of twenty Canadian Muslim youth and their political identities – their sense 
of themselves as political actors (or non-actors) in a Canadian context.11  It is meant to address 
the lacunae in our existing knowledge on the civic and political participation of Muslims in 
Canada. The article begins in the next section with an introduction to the framework that has 
guided us in our readings and interpretations of the interviews.  We then turn to the analysis of 
the data, focusing on the most important themes giving us insight into our interviewees’ concepts 
of political participation.  These themes move in overlapping points from a more specific focus 
on political participation toward more general matters: conceptions of the self as a political actor, 
from formal to informal to civic political involvement and the relationship between religious and 
Canadian identities. We identify each interviewee anonymously through pseudonyms.  Appendix 
One lists some basic information for each interviewee.  
 
Research Framework, Methodology and Data Collection 
Our principal methodology is semi-structured in-depth interviewing. As with all qualitative 
research, our aim is to explore the lived experiences and constructed identities of our 
interviewees in depth, to capture nuance, ambiguity, and complexity. Our core approach to 
interviewing is what Silverman refers to as “realist.” He says: “Interviews….offer a rich source 
of data which provide access to how people account for both their troubles and good fortune.”12 
The interview process is dialogical (conversational) and interactive and we pay attention both to 
the content of the material and to the context and form or style of delivery. Behind these 
proximate settings, we take into account the structural bases of the insertion of mostly new 
Muslim immigrants and their children into the citizenship regime of Canadian multicultural 
integration. We are further informed, more generally, by the global historical forces that have 
shaped and conditioned the life-chances of Muslims in Canada.  Our objective is not so much to 
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discern the singular truth through our questions, but rather to explore the displays and accounts 
of attitudes, perspectives, morals, and reconstructed biographies.13   
As mentioned above, our research calls into question the dominance of anti-terrorism 
discourses, through opening up an academic enquiry into the lived experiences of young 
Muslims in Canada.  We made a conscious decision to avoid producing a study framed through 
the “Muslim youth are radicalising” framework. It became clear to us early in the designing of 
our study that such a framework was of little relevance to the lived experiences of our 
interviewees. Moreover, we believe that no matter how well-intentioned, terrorism-framed 
studies create an archetype of an “unlikeable character” – a citizen prone to violence against his 
own community. We focus on another set of questions, grounded in a more positive and 
pluralistic politics of care, respect, and engagement. While we begin with few substantive 
assumptions, our empirical enquiry invites young Muslims to respond to a more generic set of 
prompts regarding their routine, integrated, and political practices. Guided by the research of 
Adsett,14 Bastedo,15 Chareka and Sears,16 Gauthier,17 O’Neill,18 Stolle and Cruz,19 and others on 
Canadian youth and political participation, we examine patterns of political participation among 
twenty Muslim youth in Canada. To what extent do the young Muslim women and men already 
engage in political activity and how far do they want to contribute to the political fabric of 
Canada through encounter, dialogue, and participation? Our research assumption was that when 
it comes to political participation, young Muslims share much in common with other young 
people. Therefore, to study Canadian Muslim youth, our chosen research framework was that of 
Canadian and other studies in youth political participation.   
We conducted twenty interviews in late 2010 and early 2011 (ten each in London and the 
Greater Toronto Area). Each interview lasted between twenty-five minutes and more than two 
hours. Our criterion for selecting interviewees was deliberately broad.  While being aware that 
qualitative research never makes claims of generalizability, to ensure that our group of 
interviewees was not all from the same ethnic group, we sought as broad a spectrum as possible 
of youth from different ethnic backgrounds.  We set the definition of “youth” according to the 
United Nations as individuals aged between fifteen and twenty-four.  We aimed for gender 
balance and each of us sought five female and five male interviewees.  We also tried to find 
youth from different social classes (though were not successful, as all of the interviewees were 
university students, or university bound, with middle-class family status).  We aimed for a 
balance between practicing and non-practicing Muslim youth, though naturally, such distinctions 
are hard to know in advance.  Our interviews were obtained through our network of personal 
contacts in the Muslim community.  Any process of selection of interviewees carries with it the 
challenges of selection bias. In the case of our interviewees, the generalized atmosphere of anti-
Muslim sentiments and the radicalization/terrorism frame required us to establish bonds of trust. 
Such a necessity placed us closer to our interviewees than is often the case in studies of this kind. 
However, we are confident in light of our data that their responses were not shaped by “social 
desirability” propensities such as the “Hawthorne Effect.” We are confident that each of our 
interviewees spoke frankly, fully and without fear or favour. 
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Political Participation among the Interviewees 
 
There is deep and long-standing concern among political commentators and academics at the 
lack of political engagement among Canada’s youth. It is significant to note that this is not 
merely a Canadian issue. Concern at the lack of political engagement among youth is widespread 
in the West. Gauthier reports that the decline in electoral participation among youth has been 
widespread throughout Western societies.20 
A readily available measure of conventional political participation is voting. To vote is to 
engage in the simplest of political acts. Voter turnout among youth in Canada has been declining 
for some decades. Adsett chronicles “a large decline in the voter turnout rates of the two 
youngest age groups…between 1980 and 1984.”21 According to Barnes, voter turnout rates for 
Canadians aged 18-24 and 25-29 declined further and substantially in the early part of the 21st 
century.  Referring to the Canadian federal elections of 2004, 2006, and 2008, Barnes says: “the 
gap between the estimated average voter turnout and the estimated turnout of the second 
youngest age cohort was in the order of 15%, while the same gap for the youngest cohort was in 
the order of 20%.”22 Barnes notes that voter turnout among the youngest age cohort was around 
37% in 2004 and 2008, but spiked up to 44% in 2006.  
Declines in the youth vote are not principally “life-cycle” effects, that is, those caused by 
the relative lack of interest among youth in contrast with their more mature peers. They are also 
more likely to be the result of a “generational” effect, and, as Stolle and Cruz put it: “today’s 
youth are voting at significantly lower rates than previous generations at the same 
age.”23Amongst our interviewees, out of the sixteen old enough to vote, an impressive nine have 
done so in the last 24 months (See Appendix Two).  This is interesting since only three of our 
interviewees give an affirmative to the question, “Do you regard yourself as a political person?”  
Nine say “No,” and eight are in-between, expressing either an interest in following the news, and 
politics, with a good general knowledge of basic political questions, but are not actively involved 
in the formal political process.24  This suggests a complicated relationship between the act of 
voting and conceptions of politics in relationship to the self.  A few think of themselves as not 
politically engaged yet participate in highly politicised events in the informal sector, such as 
signing a petition against Bill 94 (a Quebec Bill requiring women wearing the niqab to reveal 
their faces in their interactions with the Quebec government), or demonstrating on behalf of 
Palestinians.  
 In contrast to the claim made by Andrew Ellis of CSIS, that Canadian Muslim youth tell 
him that they do not participate because of their religion, it is important to note that only one of 
our interviewees mentioned religious or philosophical reasons as to why he is not involved in the 
formal political process, his rationale is in part pragmatic. In fact, religious reasons are central as 
motivators for those of our interviewees most highly engaged in formal politics and civic 
engagement. This finding is consistent with other studies.25 
 
 
5 
 
Throughout this article, we follow O’Neill in drawing a distinction between being 
engaged in formal politics (the electoral process), informal politics (including lobbying, activism 
on political issues, letter writing, petition signing, and attending rallies), and civic engagement 
(volunteerism in community-based activities).  What emerges from the data are three broad 
clustering of responses to questions designed to explore the interviewees’ interest in politics, 
engagement in politics, and sense of self as a political actor.  These are typologised as: Not 
Politically Engaged (NPE); Sometimes Politically Engaged (SPE); and Politically Engaged (PE).  
For the purposes of data analysis, the interviewees have been grouped into these three categories, 
but should be thought of as loosely placed. Sometimes, an interviewee is potentially interested in 
politics but not actively engaged.  These interviewees have been placed into the middle category, 
(SPE). Naturally, a single person can move back or forth on the spectrum over time, depending 
on issues involved. Non-involvement in formal politics does not signify being politically 
unengaged. Indeed, in the area of civic activism and volunteerism, our research shows an 
impressively high involvement, since all of our twenty interviewees are involved, to varying 
degrees, in the civic sector.  Our presentation of the data in subsequent sections makes reference 
to these classifications, but is not organized according to them. To summarize our findings in one 
phrase, our interviewees display a generalized willingness to engage and a strong desire to be 
involved in the political and social fabric of Canada.26   
 
 
Not Involved In Formal Politics 
The most commonly stated reasons for non-participation in formal politics were: lack of 
interest; lack of time; the belief that politics is boring; the belief that things are smooth in 
Canada, not like “back home” (so there’s no need to be involved); and being under age (with the 
expectation of becoming interested in politics once reaching the legal age for voting). 
   Chareka and Sears’ qualitative study seeking to explain why youth vote less concluded 
that most reasons are due to the fact that politicians are seen to be: “largely ineffective, that there 
is little real difference among political parties, and that politicians cannot be trusted.”27 In their 
study, the immigrant and other youth report knowing the importance and value of democratic 
choice and the vote, and are concerned with contributing to public life. However, they do not 
believe that conventional political activity is the best way in which to achieve it.  Bastedo, 
Goodman, LeDuc and Pammett’s analysis confirms this.  Their qualitative study concludes that 
for youth, voting may be linked to a deeper concept of citizenship that includes a sense of 
obligation to contribute, but which is balanced against a perception of efficacy. “The turnout 
decline may in part be a result of gradual replacement of a generation that viewed voting as a 
‘civic duty’ by one that is more inclined to feel that voting is simply not worthwhile.”28 
  Similarly, amongst our interviewees, it was neither apathy nor lack of knowledge that 
kept some of them uninvolved in formal politics.  A few interviewees articulate trenchant 
criticisms of electoral politics.  Hebba follows politics, in terms of general knowledge, but has 
made a decision not to get involved in electoral politics, because she feels it is more effective to 
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help people through grass-roots activism than through politics. Like Aliya (“Even if you vote 
them in, I don’t think citizens really have a say in what happens in politics.”), Nader (“I feel like 
I would probably be a drop in the ocean. It won’t make a difference,”), (and Qayyum, see below) 
Hebba regards politics as a bit of a game, an elite activity, upon which she can have little impact: 
 
[When I think of politics] I think of also pretending, and what I mean by that is, 
there are a lot of individuals that are or say that they will represent the people but 
then in hindsight they’re representing their own political party and their own 
ideologies and own voices, and in my opinion what’s effective is the way they sell 
to the people how they’re going to represent the people...  …. (NPE) 
 
Other interviewees, including those three who see themselves as “political,” express 
reservations about being involved in formal politics based in the language of democratic theory: 
that the institutions of Canadian liberal democracy have been compromised by racism (Qais, 
NPE); the Harper government’s “[un]-productive” practices (Aminah, PE); the need for reform 
in the electoral system, especially the issue of first past the post and proportional representation 
(Aminah (PE), Irfan, (SPE), Sumayyah (PE));  the problem of low voter turnout (Aisha (PE), 
Aliya (SPE)); and the problem of the party system and being tied to a platform, rather than being 
able to disaggregate policy options (Farouq, NPE).  Nader argued that Canada was a “pseudo-
democracy” because the Senate is appointed, and because the current prime minister is voted in 
without a majority of the votes.  
Suheil’s experiences with corruption in his native country influenced his view of political 
participation in Canada: 
 
I do follow politics.  But to me…a lot of politics has a lot of lies, I think…  The 
reason we ran away, well, the reason we came to Canada, and one of the main 
reasons why we decided to stay, was because of political problems back home… 
if I have to rate myself 1 to 10, I would say 4, as a 4. (SPE) 
 
Only Qayyum comes close to advancing a religious/ideological reason for not voting: 
“…I don’t think they [Islam and democracy] are compatible, only because Islam is -- when 
there’s something written in the Quran, you can’t change it, right.  In a democracy, it can be 
changed (NPE).”  But as he combined this with a more traditional reason for non-participation, 
we cannot conclude that his decision not to be involved in the political process was solely 
religiously motivated. He says: “I tend to move away from politics only because I feel like I 
don’t have a say in it... people will vote, yeah, you gave your vote in, however, do they really 
have a say in politics, I don’t believe they do.  That’s why I don’t vote (NPE).”  Like some of the 
others, Qayyum perceives politics as an elite game in which he is unable to make a positive 
impact on the youth whose lives he cares so much about.  However, at the end of the interview, 
he argues that he would get more involved in political organizations if he felt it could bring about 
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positive change: “For me I am starting off, you know, actually I will go into politics hopefully if 
it interests me a little, if I feel I can make a difference in there (NPE).”  Qayyum thus begins the 
interview confirming Andrew Ellis’ claim about Muslim youth not participating in politics for 
religious reasons, but he ends his interview echoing ideas of other Canadian youth more 
generally.  It is worth asking whether Ellis’s interviewees would give similarly nuanced answers, 
given the opportunity fully to express themselves. 
It is these beliefs, that as an individual they cannot exert an impact on government, which 
had led some of the SPE/NPE to disengage from electoral politics.  These insights turn the tables 
on the non-participation issue of youth in the political process: if someone believes participation 
will not make a difference, and/or that the system is in strong need of reform, it is not surprising 
that they lose interest.  We need to turn our attention to the political system itself and question its 
responsiveness. 
 
 Interested but Sometimes Engaged in Formal Politics 
 
Other interviewees were interested in politics, but not actively or frequently engaged.  Irfan, 
Nader, and Aliyah mentioned lack of time (not interest) as a factor, and also expressed some 
degree of guilt at not being more involved.  In Nader’s words: “I have a lot of things to 
contribute. However right now, due to like school and you know million other things going in 
your life at this point, I feel like I – I don’t have the wherewithal to which actually give back 
right now as much as I’d like [sic] (SPE).” 
As O’Neill has observed, there is a disconnect between youth politics and the adult world 
of politics.  Our own research confirms this. Asiya says “[I do not regard myself a political 
person] Not at all.  I have never taken politics.  I’m not into politics at all (NPE).”  However, 
during the interview we discovered that she always voted in student elections at her university.  
Further questioning revealed she had been elected for four years as an executive member of her 
high school Muslim Student Association. This kind of discrepancy between actual political 
activity and not regarding oneself a political person was found in several interviewees. It is best 
explained by assuming that by “politics” our interviewees take a traditional view which equates 
politics with the adult world of elections.  It also means that the potential for deeper engagement 
with Canadian politics is there, waiting to be tapped.   
 Other examples of a middle ground in terms of interest and engagement are seen through 
the eyes of Habib and Fatima, both of whom could see themselves as being elected to Prime 
Minister.  “A political person?  Oh, well, I like to -- I like politics.  I actually wanted to be like a 
political leader myself like -- well, like a prime minister, the Prime Minister of Canada (Habib, 
SPE).” And in spite of not being able to define “democracy,” Fatima responds with a laugh that 
she could see herself as a candidate for Prime Minister.  But then she adds that it would be 
difficult to achieve: “Yeah.  But then you realize then yeah, it's too much -- too much work, too 
hard to reach (SPE).” 
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 Other interviewees expressed the sense that a Muslim would not be seen as eligible for 
office by other non-Muslim Canadians, being penalised for their “Muslimness.”  However, to 
find young Muslim Canadians dreaming about holding the highest political office is extremely 
important.  This kind of yearning and ambition, is very important for inclusion in a society, as it 
is a signal of integration at all levels, political, social, economic. 
 
Politically Engaged 
 
Whether in terms of party support or their general values on social and economic issues, 
the interviewees exhibit little ideological conservatism. Of the fifteen who state a political party 
that is closest to representing their views, all name the Liberal Party or the New Democratic 
Party. When it comes to social issues, six claim to be progressive and ten are somewhere in the 
middle. Only two are conservative. Similar patterns are evident regarding economic issues, even 
though fewer give a definitive response. Six are progressive, six are in the middle, and one is 
conservative on economic issues. From the responses of many of our interviewees, it is clear that 
they are not familiar with the “conservative” and “progressive” ideological labels. In some 
instances, the interviewees asked for further explanations and elaborations and we responded 
accordingly.  
Only three of our interviewees (Sumayyah, Aminah and Aisha) consider themselves very 
much a “political person.”  Sumayyah is very active in informal, not formal politics (see the next 
subsection below), Aminah follows politics closely, but is not a member of any party, and Aisha 
is highly engaged in the formal political sector, being a member of the Liberal Party.  It is 
noteworthy that  given the widespread media image of the “submissive veiled Muslim woman,” 
all three interviewees in the most highly engaged category are women: Aminah wears a niqab 
(face-veil), while Sumayyah and Aisha wear hijab.   The face-veil has not hindered Aminah from 
being interested or involved in politics: 
Yes, I would consider [myself a political person]… try to keep myself aware of 
what’s going on, I -- I look at different parties that are in the Canadian system, at 
the electoral system…. I haven’t voted yet but because I wasn’t much in politics 
before but now that I’m like I’m becoming interested and when the time comes 
I’ll probably vote as well…(PE) 
 
While talking about having an impact on the government, Aminah is open to the idea of joining a 
political party, but holds back because she is unenthusiastic about her political choices: “.”(PE)  
Aminah’s ambivalence on joining a political party is not uncommon, except that she wears a face 
veil, a garment that is usually associated either with submissiveness or extreme radicalisation, 
neither of which lends itself to the idea of joining a political party in order to influence 
government.  Considering the widespread public approval for banning the niqab, her responses 
are an important research finding. 
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 Only one of our interviewees, Aisha, is both politically interested and politically engaged 
in formal politics, being a member of a political party.  She became involved when someone her 
family knew personally ran for office.  The whole family volunteered on his campaign, and 
through this became politically sensitized.  She joined the candidate’s political party, later 
interned for a sitting politician, and attended a youth summit for Muslim youth interested in 
politics.  Her involvement in the candidate’s campaign began to sensitize her to local issues.  Her 
trip to the youth summit was an eye opener as she met Muslim youth from across North America 
who were involved in their local communities.  She came to believe that Muslims ought to be 
more involved in their local communities, rather than international issues, in order to be “true 
citizens.” (PE) 
 (Aisha. PE) 
 
Aisha argues that Muslims should become politically involved, “I honestly believe if you don’t 
feel the need to speak out and to … become involved, then you have no right to complain (PE).” 
She thinks this would also lead to more respect for Muslims in Canada. 
 
 Informal Political Activity 
 
An important facet of the conundrum of declining youth involvement in formal politics is 
explored in O’Neill’s research.  O’Neill points out that while young Canadians tend not to 
engage in traditional political activities, such as voting and joining political parties, and while 
their level of political knowledge is lower than other Canadians, nevertheless, they do participate 
extensively in non-traditional political activities, such as demonstrations, signing petitions, 
boycotts, buycotts, and belong to community groups and organizations that meets or exceeds the 
levels of all adult Canadians.29  Stolle and Cruz conclude that young Canadians perceive interest 
groups to be more effective agents of change than parties.30  Adsett reports that Canadian and 
other youth become politically engaged over issues such as equality, justice, civil rights, or 
nationalism that inspire and mobilize through a shared sense of vision.31 
 In other words, Canadian youth engage in non-traditional political participation and civic 
participation, even if their levels of traditional political participation are low. As O’Neill says, 
“generalizations of political apathy among youth adopt a very narrow definition of political 
engagement.”32 She contends that “…political science has to reconceptualize political 
participation to include activity aimed at shaping society rather than simply aimed at influencing 
those institutions associated directly with representative democracy.”33 
Our research is consistent with these findings.   While very few of our interviewees are 
interested in following formal politics, and even less actively involved in traditional parties, at 
least half of those who say they are not political, or interested in politics, have participated in 
rallies, protests, petitions, or had conversations with friends about political issues thought 
directly to affect them, such as lobbying against the niqab ban or Palestinian issues.  This pattern 
resonates with Hamdani’s study of Muslim women, who found that while voter turnout was low, 
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Muslim women were more likely to engage in informal than formal politics, with signing a 
petition as the most frequent activity.34 
 Sumayyah is one of a few interviewees who sees herself as a political person and is 
highly engaged in the informal (non-traditional) sector. “That’s how I start my morning and 
ended my day (sic.)” (PE)  She grew up in a non-political Palestinian refugee family in Kuwait.  
After moving to Canada, she began her own education about the issues: “I wasn't raised in a 
political household. We didn’t have political discussions. Yes, my parents watched the news a 
lot. But it was not discussed around the house. “  Sumayyah  considers herself “blessed” to be in 
Canada, and “I – I believe in giving back because – because of where I’ve come from, because of 
what I’ve seen my parents go through, I really believe that simply being here is a gift.”  She has 
become deeply engaged in volunteering in the charitable sector, and also in activism in the 
informal political arena, especially around Palestinian issues.  She started volunteering for the 
local Muslim Student Association at her university, which led to other volunteer opportunities, 
including Oxfam and her local television station. 
 
 
 
Attitudes Toward The Self As A Political Actor   
 
We have demonstrated how non-participation in formal politics might not be linked to apathy, 
but rather to intelligent criticisms of the political process. Maymuna, who is not politically 
engaged, nevertheless displays a belief in the  efficacy of an individual influencing politics 
saying simply “Yes…Because every vote counts (NPE).” She looks forward to voting once she 
turns 18.  Likewise, Luqman is more optimistic: “…there is definitely ways to be able to send it 
[a political claim] up – to be able to get up to a parliament and they can look at it. So I think it – 
yeah if I needed, if I wanted something to be changed, I could – I’d be able to some degree.” 
(SPE) 
 Aisha is our most highly engaged interviewee in the formal sector. Despite her criticisms 
of the system based on her experience as a parliamentary intern,she says “so long as there is  a 
group behind you… it’s possible to do things on your own, but I -- I think you will only get to a 
certain point and then you will realize that power is in numbers (PE). 
 
 Huda, Habib, Sumayyah, amongst others also feel that to effect change in the political 
realm it was necessary to be a part of a group.  As Huda says, “I have been kind of involved in 
that [protests and petition] in the past.  And I think it’s not so much making politicians aware, but 
its people in general, and then we get a lot of people together, I guess it can make an impact.” 
(SPE) 
 
Involvement in Civic And Volunteer Activism 
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Our interviewees display an impressive commitment toward civic engagement and community 
volunteerism. Fourteen of the twenty are involved with volunteering for one or more non-profit 
organizations consistently; three volunteer on an ad-hoc basis; two are available during summer 
holidays only; and only one does not volunteer at present.  The extent of volunteer activity 
varies, from being involved in multiple organisations with a high monthly time commitment, to 
involvement in fewer organisations, or less frequently. Significantly, twelve interviewees 
volunteer at non-Muslim organisations, some exclusively and some in addition to volunteering 
for the local mosque, MSA or other Muslim groups.   While volunteering for an MSA, our 
interviewees fundraise not only for Muslim causes, but also non-Muslim charities.  Fatima, 
whose volunteer work is “only” with the MSA, has been managing fundraising both for the 
London food bank, collecting over 2000 cans of food, and raising over $700 for breast cancer 
research (SPE). 
 
 
 
Qayyum, who had earlier expressed his hesitation about not being politically involved 
because it was against Islam, nevertheless is involved as a volunteer:   
 
Well, I do a lot for youth. I target inner city youth. I started up a non-profit 
organization…and we’ve made one video and a trailer right now, sort of to show 
them how crime can be deterred and how crime is, you know, it’s all you, it’s not 
really anybody else, like you’re responsible for your actions, right? I work with 
a… refugee treatment house and I work with the youth there on Saturdays. I work 
with Big Brothers Big Sisters of Peel and I coach as an assistant [with another 
group] and I have my own basketball youth clinic for Muslim youth. That’s the 
only thing that’s just for Muslim youth…(NPE) 
 
Given the widespread negative media narrative that Muslim youth are alienated loners, 
vulnerable to extremism, do not integrate, or make positive contributions to their society, this 
youth involvement in charitable work is noteworthy.  Significantly, nearly every interviewee 
argues that charitable work should not be confined to Muslims only, but given to anyone who 
needs help.   Interestingly, there do not appear to be any significant gender differences pertaining 
to either political or civic engagement.  Hence our research corroborates other studies of 
Canadian youth and volunteerism.  O’Neill found that: “Young Canadians report higher 
rates of volunteering activity than all other Canadians.”35 Similar research has also 
demonstrated that, while not necessarily participating in formal politics, immigrant and 
minority political activity, especially among women, is highly concentrated in the 
informal sector.36  
 Volunteerism is clearly a good for society, which benefits from free labour, skills, time 
and care and love given by volunteers, none of which is easily replaced by the government or 
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private sector.   Gauthier rightly concludes from this kind of finding that “despite commonly held 
opinions, contemporary young people are far from apathetic. They are active at various levels of 
involvement in community life, although political partisanship is often considered suspect.”37  
Some research highlights that civic engagement can lead to engagement in formal politics,38 but 
others has not.  Tossutti, in her study of Canadian immigrants between 15 and 34 years, reported 
that membership in voluntary organizations was positively correlated with voting and interest in 
politics. 39 However, her research demonstrated that individual-level voluntary work (outside of 
organized voluntary groups) did not correlate with higher levels of political engagement.40  
Moosa-Mitha’s study of Canadian Muslim youth concluded that high levels of civic engagement 
were a way of coping against the largely negative mainstream discourse of the Muslim identity 
as a “security risk.”41 
These findings find a powerful echo in the American research of Lance Bennett. Noting 
that voluntary work, consumer activism, socio-economic justice causes, and on-line community 
building are prominent areas of youth political engagement, Bennett makes the astute 
observation that “managed environments seem inauthentic and irrelevant to many young 
people.”42 This search for authenticity and direct relevance leads Bennett to echo the claim of 
Peter Levine that citizens should not only be prepared for politics, but the realm of political life 
needs to reshape itself so that it might better serve the needs and requirements of a new 
generation of citizens. Bennett expresses this as a cross-national shift in the West from the model 
of the “dutiful citizen” to the “actualizing citizen” model which favours “loosely networked 
activism to address issues that reflect personal values.”43  
Our study gives us hope for engaged, caring and active Canadian Muslim citizens.  When 
asked whether Canadian Muslims should become more involved in the political process, a full 
seventeen said “yes,” while three said that it depends if the person is interested in politics. It is 
evident that this group wants others to join them in their high degree of political engagement, 
which is at least a personal aspiration, if not quite a reality. 
 
Religion and Canadian Identities 
 
Canada has earned a positive reputation as a peaceful and just society in which an 
increasingly diverse polyethnic community lives together in a pluralistic and multicultural 
order.44 Despite this, Canada’s history as a white-settler colony,45 with its associated racist and 
ethnic exclusionary and discriminatory policies, combined with the rise of recent global tensions 
and panics regarding Islam and Muslims, has generated a political culture of fear and insecurity 
that has affected both Muslim and other Canadians.46 Generalized anti-terrorism discourses have 
conditioned fear, retreat, and essentialism on the part of at least some Canadians (non-Muslim 
and Muslim). These discourses have also conditioned a climate of social exclusion and hostility 
that has found expression both in the broader culture and institutional practices. This climate of 
fear and mistrust has conditioned both hate crimes and the erosion of Muslim civil liberties.47 
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How does this context affect our interviewees’ sense of religious and Canadian identity and their 
views of citizenship? 
 
 
One of the strongest themes that emerged from our interviewees is their commitment to their 
faith: every single interviewee states that their religion is a very important part of their identity, 
even those that look on the surface too “cool” or “fashionable” to be religious.  It turns out that 
this is consistent with other studies of Canadian and US Muslim youth.48 Rabia captures this 
theme well: “I think it’s [religion] really important.  I identify myself with my religion.  In terms 
of who I am, I guess, I mean, my religion has certain guidelines that I should abide by and… I 
have a calling to something greater that it really… shapes who I am.” (NPE) 
 
Religion and Citizenship 
 
In terms of the key research question of this article – young Muslims and their perceptions of 
political participation in Canada – it is significant to note when interviewees mention 
compatibility issues, many draw the distinction between deeper commitments to moral values 
versus superficial differences in customs, such as, sex/modest dress or alcohol.  Most of our 
interviewees found a modus vivendi between their “Canadian” and “Muslim” identities.  Nearly 
all of them said it was possible to be a devout Muslim and an active citizen in Canada. 
Reservations to this generalization include those of Rabia : 
 
Well, our values, they’re not exactly compatible.… the underlying values, I would 
say are compatible…You know, respect each other…You know, I guess our 
morals and our ethics are there, they are all the same.  Be kind to each other, these 
kinds of things…In terms of social aspects, being a Canadian, there is a lot of, I 
guess, indulgence into desires and something like that, which you know, we tend 
to stay away from…[like] Hmm.  Alcohol, sex…Nudity and all that stuff. (Rabia, 
NPE) 
 
Hebba, Asiya and others draw a distinction between national identity and religious 
identity: 
Of course, I think you can be a devout Muslim and an engaged citizen, Canadian 
citizen.  Being Canadian, that’s a nationality, being a Muslim, that’s a 
religion…(Hebba, NPE) 
 
 
Even Aminah,  who wears a face veil does not consider it to be a barrier to her active 
citizenship:   
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Regardless with the veil like if I want to do something I would do it like even if -- 
even if I wasn’t wearing the veil I would ….If I want to become a part of the 
organization and the veil is not really stopping me, I mean it may discomfort 
some other people but that’s their problem like with me it’s my choice so, it -- I 
don’t think it really -- for me it’s fine, I mean I think I can operate in the society 
without having a problem (PE). 
 
A few sites of tension emerged for some interviewees at the possibility of complete 
compatibility between devoutness and active citizenship.  Nader’s reservations come from his 
fragile sense of Muslim belonging to Canada (see below), that Canada would not accept a fully 
devout Muslim as being part of political society:  
 
……if you want to have a beard and you want to be involved politically, I don’t 
know how well you’re going to do. (SPE). 
 
Aliya and Qassim’s reservations are based on a sense that being involved in Canadian 
politics would most likely mean you would have to give up aspects of your Islamic practice in 
order to succeed.  For example, having to stand up for the Canadian anthem, which is  “ a ritual 
or outside of the Muslim faith (SPE).”  
Aliya also feels that hijab would be a barrier, and personally had gone through a difficult process 
for several years during high school, where she had been unable to establish comfort wearing the 
hijab because she felt people saw her through a stereotype rather than for who she was.  She 
eventually removed her hijab (three years before the interview).49   
Qassim is worried that (from his perspective) politicians are only out to serve themselves 
and that back room deal-making compromises a religious commitment to loyalty and justice.  He 
goes further, stating that it is possible to be a devout Muslim and an active citizen if by going 
into politics you help the Muslim community.  Conversely, if by entering politics you are not 
helping the Muslim community, then you should not pursue that endeavour.  This is interesting, 
given his earlier arguments that Islam and democracy are not compatible.  He raises the thorny 
issue of Canadians abroad killing other Muslims: “If they are going and killing people in 
Afghanistan, they’re killing people in Muslim countries, then no.  If you are going -- if you go 
into politics to change that, then yes, go ahead (NPE).”  
 Being an army cadet and considering an army career, this issue has real salience for 
Luqman: 
 
I think that contradiction [between being a devout Muslim and a fully engaged 
Canadian citizen] would come if you go -- if I end up having to go overseas 
because then it could be looked at ‘Oh yeah, I am in the Canadian military killing 
other Muslims’ and that’s like -- that’s the big thing that a lot of people -- that’s 
the first thing they say like oh, it’s a Muslim and go to Muslim country and go 
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killing Muslims but I think if I were to join the military and be able to stay in 
Canada and not have to go overseas like that I don’t think it would, it gets in the 
way because they’re really -- like just being in army cadets they’re -- all the 
military guys that I’ve been with they’re all understanding and they know that 
okay, if it’s prayer time you can go pray or you need to do something you could 
have that time (SPE). 
 
Luqman believes that he could resolve such an issue by joining as a cadet instructor.  Andrew 
March has explored this dilemma from the point of view of liberal theory. He argues that a 
liberal theory of citizenship could articulate a conscientious objection to fighting a Muslim 
majority army on behalf of the Muslim citizen solider, without compromising that Muslim 
soldier’s citizenship status and belonging in a liberal-democratic society.50  
 
The Bases of Political Interest – Religious and Secular Beliefs 
 
Several interviewees express a wish to “give back” to Canada through volunteerism.  Their 
motivations have two sources: first, they feel very grateful for the opportunities present in 
Canada as compared to the corruption, poverty, lack of opportunities from their parents’ country; 
and, second, from a sense of duty to contribute springing from their religion or their sense of 
citizenship, often articulated through the concepts of liberal-democratic theory.  As Hebba puts 
it, “I grew up in Canada, so I consider Canada to be my home above any other place in the 
world, and that’s my sincere opinion…  I want to make sure that I stand out, not only as a 
Canadian but as a Muslim Canadian who can make a difference for Canadian society as a whole 
(NPE).”  
 Significantly, the most highly politically engaged (Aisha) is also the only interviewee 
who explains her involvement in formal politics from a directly religious perspective. “I think 
it’s about learning from -- the Prophet (sallallahu alaihi wasallam)…and trying to implement 
situations that are relatable to us today and his example “ Her Islamic sense of duty regarding 
being politically involved has merged with a sense of citizenship “duty” that is found in liberal-
democratic theory: 
“I just want to say on the flip side that citizenship is not only enjoying your right, 
it’s also about giving other people their -- their rights ….you sort of need to 
become a part to change.” 
 
Conventional wisdom in the security community is that religiosity, especially that connected to 
major Islamic grassroots organisations, such as ISNA/ICNA, MAC, Al Huda, is part of the 
conveyor belt to radicalization. 51 But Aisha and Aminah, who are active members of MAC and 
Al Huda respectively, and wear hijab/niqab respectively, challenge such assumptions.  In line 
with other research conducted by Amaney Jamal, it appears that increased religiosity and active 
membership in traditional conservative Muslim groups often translates into high political and/or 
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civic engagement.  MAC, in particular, has stressed active citizenship as part of one’s religious 
duty.52  It has a big presence in London, and as we can see from the high civic engagement from 
the youth there, its message resonates with many Canadian Muslim youth. 
 
Canadian Muslims as Citizens of Canada. 
 
So far we have been investigating the concepts of religious identity and its compatibility with the 
Canadian identity from the perspectives of our Muslim interviewees.  When we flip the 
perspectives around, and ask similar questions from the perspectives of wider Canadian society, 
we find a different story.  A recent Environics survey found that "...while Muslims see 
themselves as wanting to participate in and adapt to Canadian society...the population at large 
tends to doubt this willingness."53  Hamdani cites a 2004 Ipsos-Reid poll, which found that “30% 
of the respondents said that they would not vote for a political party led by a Muslim leader – the 
highest negative sentiment among several groups which included people of different genders, 
sexual orientation and ethnic backgrounds.”54  
Our interviewees are able to differentiate between an abstract notion of citizenship, 
(“What does citizenship mean to you?”), and the specific inflection of being Muslim during a 
time when the national citizenship narrative of Muslims is that of a “security risk.”55  Even 
though our interviewees express their sense of Canadianness and modus vivendi with these 
different identities, they are well aware of how they are perceived through non-Muslim Canadian 
lenses.  All our interviewees feel that, some tolerant and educated Canadians notwithstanding, in 
general (mostly due to the media), Canadian non-Muslims do not understand Islam.   This affects 
their sense of belonging in a negative way, for it has given many of them a sense that while they 
themselves feel to be citizens, their citizenship is fragile and at risk. 56  These themes emerge 
most strongly when discussing the Canadian justice system, and questions related to 
Canadian/Muslim citizenship. 
 Owing to their class status, most of our interviewees have had little contact with the 
police, other than being ticketed or present while a friend/parent was ticketed for speeding or not 
wearing a bike helmet.  Nevertheless, only a minority express unreserved faith in Canada’s 
justice system, most of them from the group not interested in politics. Several interviewees 
articulate that although the system is generally just, they have seen others, or have personally 
experienced themselves what they perceive as unjust treatment. That unjust treatment is specified 
as wrongful arrests,57 or being unable to afford a lawyer, and therefore unable to pursue justice.58  
Sumayyah (PE) lost faith after the problems with policing at the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto. 
There are two specific events, whether from the politically engaged, sometimes 
politically engaged, or not politically engaged, that have led these youth to a “decline[…](Asiya, 
NPE)” in their faith in the Canadian justice system: (i) the Omar Khadr case; and (ii) the trial of 
the Toronto 18.  Qassim sums it up: “Oh yeah, Muslims get penalized more than I think they 
should.  Like the Omar, I don’t know if you, I read up on it and I read that he was, you know, 
punished a bit more than he should have (NPE).” Or, in Aliya’s words: 
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I do have faith in it but then there are some points where I just -- I remember one 
time I was reading on the Toronto 18 and everything that I felt about Canadian 
politics just plummeted like that was the worse point that I’ve ever been in as 
being a Canadian citizen and I don’t know why I felt so hurt by it but I was really 
really hurt by what I was seeing what was happening to, like, guys who live 
within my neighborhood kind of thing, right…(Aliyah, SPE) 
 
These feelings of betrayal, disappointment and the targeted policing of Muslims, cut across all 
groups in our study.59  While no interviewee approves of the use of violence to make changes in 
political society (barring the few who said violence might be necessary in a war of liberation), 
and while none approves of, and several are explicitly critical of, the Toronto 18, a sense of 
common identity with these young people transcends those critiques.60  These young Muslims 
are keenly aware, whether or not they actually follow politics, that post 9/11, “being Muslim” is 
an identity that has been singled out in mainstream discourse for disapproval.61 
  Two additional interesting findings emerge out of this question on the Canadian justice 
system that are relevant both to the question of faith in the justice system and ultimately to 
political engagement.  They are nearly identical, but should be articulated separately in order to 
catch their nuance: First a surprising number of the London youth have not heard of the Toronto 
18. By contrast, most of the GTA youth have heard of the Toronto 18,indeed, a few know 
personally one who had been arrested. Second, of the interviewees who mention the Toronto 18, 
quite a few make comments along the lines of “Oh yes, I have heard something about them.” On 
being asked to comment on the Toronto 18, Umar (NPE) says “What is that?” and Hebba (NPE) 
asks “what do you mean by the Toronto 18?”  
It is significant that many of these Muslim youth have not heard of the Toronto 18, or 
may only have heard of them in some kind of distant way.  Not being on the radar means that the 
burning issues which are said to have motivated the Toronto 18 are not widespread amongst the 
youth, especially outside of Toronto.  There is clearly no network or even the existence of basic 
channels of communication regarding these incidents.  This calls into question the government’s 
“Muslim youth as radicalized” approach to counter-terrorism, because that approach assumes 
guilt before innocence, whereas our interviewees have little idea of the issues involved.  If it is 
said that we interviewed only twenty youth for this article, given how involved they are in their 
communities, it would be a very odd bubble indeed for most Muslim youth around them to be 
radicalizing and them not to know of it or notice it.  It is more likely the other way around – that 
the few youth that come under the security apparatus’ radar are isolated and in bubbles, 
disconnected from their communities.  This is a crucial point in addressing counter-terrorism. 
  The Demos report found that outreach work by the RCMP was often focused on the 
Muslim community as suspects or requests that Muslims spy on fellow Muslims.62 Nader’s story 
is consistent with this finding.  The RCMP visited the MSA at his university in London, 
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ostensibly doing “outreach” and “prevention” work.  However, Nader feels insulted and 
alienated by this visit: 
 
We like – I was in the MSA Executive, my second year, and I remember the 
police coming to speak – speak to us saying that, I think this is like during the 
Toronto 18 thing…And they were like, hey, listen… I am constable so and so, 
you know, if you ever want to talk to us about any terrorists within your like, I 
mean coming to a bunch of students, okay, who truly, I mean all the MSA does is 
feed people…That’s our – that’s our mandate, give people a place to pray and 
feed them…That’s it. There is no grand scheme here. That’s it (SPE). 
 
Nader believes the media “lied” a lot, and that the youth were, most likely, “entrapped” by a 
CSIS mole. The police visit made him question his Canadian citizenship, and suddenly feel 
vulnerable in Canada. 
 
I feel like that Toronto 18 scenario or event, whatever you call it, those are 
citizens and their lives were – were revoked, suspended, destroyed or 
whatever….And that could easily happen to me. So it makes me wary of being a 
Canadian citizen. It makes me doubt the validity of that institution (SPE).63 
 
 But, as Sirin and Fine learned in their study, the experiences of US Muslim youth are 
diverse and complex.64  Marginalisation, alienation and exclusionary institutional policies are not 
a singular erasing experience. Aminah also relates being questioned by the RCMP because she 
attended a summer camp in 2008 which the December 24 bomber had also attended.65  However, 
she is one of the three most politically engaged interviewees, so this visit has not alienated her.  
Suheil recounts having been wrongfully arrested, but was treated respectfully by the police and 
“saved” by a judge, restoring his faith in the Canadian justice system.  Nevertheless, more than 
half our interviewees question whether or not Muslims enjoy full and equal rights of citizenship 
in Canada.  As Sumayyah puts it: 
 
Again, with – with things like, you know, security certificates, detentions, you 
know interrogation, questioning at airports, this government hasn’t made things 
any easier. Foreign policy is having a huge effect on domestic issues… 
 I too have my names on petitions. I too have made charitable donations to 
certain causes.  …I have also travelled to territories in the Middle East. 
 I mean, where do you really – where do you draw the line? How do I 
know that – that I am safe doing those things and I should be because I have a 
right to and there’s nothing wrong, and I’ve never harmed anybody. But that 
scared a lot of people...and now there is a culture of fear. And it’s subtle but it’s 
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there. And it dictates how I behave and I don’t like it. I feel really restricted. 
That’s not why I came to Canada. So it angers me to feel this way (PE). 
 
It is notable, however, that in spite of Islamophobia, and the sense of being pushed out 
from the Canadian polity, our interviewees are able to transcend and forgive these incidents, and 
still exhibit a strong willingness to engage with the Canadian polity.  A smaller example of such 
openness comes through the interviews from the young men, many of whom mention being 
teased about being a “terrorist,” being called “Osama”, for instance.  However, they seem to take 
it in stride and report, without being able to give an example, they would tease back about that 
person’s heritage. Sirin and Fine’s view of their interviewees applies equally to ours: “[their] 
experiences are…not simply about alienation and struggle but also about their engagement with 
mainstream U.S. culture.  Contrary to what many have predicted, Muslims in this country have 
not ‘given up’ their American identity for the sake of their Muslim identity…”66 
 
Conclusion 
The Demos Report opens with the following unqualified and unsubstantiated claim: “The path 
that some individuals take to a point at which they may be willing to kill others and themselves 
in the name of Islam is today’s most pressing security concern.”67 While any act of terrorism 
must be of concern to each of us, and is certainly of deep concern to our interviewees, the data 
demonstrate that in the post-9/11 United States, of the 139 reported terrorist plots recorded by 
official sources, 93 of them (67 percent) originated from non-Muslim sources,68 many of them 
white supremacists or radical anti-government elements. The persistent claims that terrorism is 
largely conducted in the name of Islam are not only misleading and racist, but crowd out the 
countervailing message of our interviewees that they want to contribute positively to the 
development of our political society.  
 The more politically engaged of our interviewees underline this very point. Aliya says: 
“…right now there is too much dialogue on terrorism and war and militancy kind of thing, so 
they [non-Muslims in Canada] would think of political Islam rather than spiritual Islam (SPE).” 
Hebba introduces the political concept of “holistic indigenousness” to underscore a very similar 
contention: “until we are holistically indigenous here in Canada like other minorities – visible 
minorities – that’s when…you’ll see a lot who are engaged in mainstream Canadian politics 
(NPE).” To become holistically engaged, there needs to be a range of processes that reduce the 
propensity for the Muslim to be “othered.” 
 While the radicalisation agenda driven by governments and the security apparatus focus 
on certain groups deemed by them to hold problematic views, those of our interviewees who 
belonged to such groups (Al Huda, MAC), were amongst the most highly engaged and positive 
in their attitudes towards holding Canadian citizenship.  Again, this is a research finding of 
importance.  Deep piety, such as wearing a face veil, is not connected to disengagement from 
Canadian society, in fact, quite the contrary.  Some of the least vigilant in their daily prayers are 
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also the least interested in politics.  If associations are actively seeking to develop deep piety in 
their adherents as well as positive and deeply engaged citizens, these groups should not be 
targeted by the security forces.  As was the case with the RCMP visit to Nader, which affected 
him negatively  and rocked his sense of belonging in Canada, if such groups feel their efforts 
stymied, ignored, or unappreciated by the policy and security community, this is a cause for 
concern.  Research on Islamic political activism in Muslim-majority countries has found that 
exclusion from the political realm encourages a turn to violence as the only way to achieve a 
goal.69 Open and inclusive systems are better buttresses than closed and exclusionary systems 
against radicalisation leading to violence.70 
The twenty Muslim youths interviewed for this report have been able to transcend 
feelings of being negatively perceived by others.  They have all arrived mostly at positions of 
deep affection and attachment to Canada, if a fragile sense of being welcomed and included, and 
this is in spite of an overriding sense that they and their faith are misunderstood by the wider 
Canadian society and having experienced some societal or institutional Islamophobia.  It is 
commendable how most of them have been able to separate a sense of being misunderstood from 
their own sense of identity and commitment to Canada.  This is extremely significant, especially 
for a long term goal of social and political integration of Muslims into Canada.  It is also an 
engagement that ought to be capitalised on by policy-makers and the intellectual elite, not 
frittered away by alienation and targeting the youth as sources of radicalisation.  
 
Appendix One 
Grid of interviewees identified by initial descriptor, displaying quantifiable data on political 
participation, socio-demographic and other characteristics. 
ID M/F Age Ethnicity YIC IS PS HS 
Level of 
Education Occ/Field  
Level of 
Engagement 
Qais M 21 Indian 5 N Y N College Teacher NPE 
Aisha F 23 Syrian 23  Y  BA 
Political 
Science 
PE 
Asiya F 21 Pakistani/Canadian 16 N Y N Uni 3 Business NPE 
Farouq M 19 Quebec/Sudani 19 Y Y Y Uni 1 
Computer 
Engineer 
NPE 
Qassim M 21 Indian 18 N Y N  Student NPE 
Dawud M 15 Algerian 15 N Y N Gr.10  NPE 
Maymuna F 17 Syria/British 14 Y Y N Gr.12 Psychology NPE 
Aliya F 20 Indian 20 Y Y N Uni 1 
Political 
Science 
SPE 
Luqman M 17 Guyana/Egypt 17 Y Y N Gr.12 
Part-time 
Lifeguard 
SPE 
Aminah F 19 Pakistani 8 N Y Y Uni  
Poli 
Sci/History 
PE 
 
 
21 
 
Umar M 20 Iraqi 7 Y Y N Uni  NPE 
Irfan M 20 South Asian 20 N Y N Uni Business SPE 
Huda F 20 Egyptian/Canadian 16 Y N Y Uni Biomedical SPE 
Habib M 18 South Asian 11 N Y N Gr.12 Engineering SPE 
Fatima F 20 Lebanese/Canadian 20 Y Y N Gr.12 
Family 
Studies 
SPE 
Rabia F 21 Pakistani 11 N Y N Gr.12 Finance NPE 
Hebba F 23 Palestinian 17 N Y N BA 
Settlement 
Worker 
NPE 
Sumayyah F 24 Palestinian 8.5 N Y N BA 
Settlement 
Worker 
PE 
Nader M 22 Pakistani 22 Y Y N HBA Business SPE 
Suheil M 21 Middle East 9.5 N Y N Uni 3 Finance SPE 
 
Key: M/F = Male or Female; YIC = Years in Canada; IS = Attended Islamic School; PS = 
Attended Public School; HS= Home Schooled; Level of Education = Highest level of education 
attained by the interviewee; Occ/Field = Occupation for interviewees who are in the workforce 
or (in italics) field of study for those interviewees who are students; Level of Engagement = PE 
= Politically Engaged; SPE = Sometimes Politically Engaged; NPE = Not Politically Engaged. 
 
Appendix Two 
Political activities taken part in during the past 24 months. 
ID V 
H
P 
MP
P 
P
M 
R
M 
C
T 
P
O 
P
R 
P
D 
F
A 
S
P 
W
B 
W
L 
I
P 
A
T 
Qais 
               
Aisha 
x  x x x x x  x x   x x x 
Asiya 
x         x      
Farouq 
x   x    x  x x     
Qassim 
         x    x  
Dawud 
               
Maymuna 
          x     
Aliya 
x   x x x  x   x   x x 
Luqman 
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Aminah 
x      x  x x x   x  
Umar 
x               
Irfan 
x   x   x x x  x  x x  
Huda 
       x  x x     
Habib 
          x x  x x 
Fatima 
        x x   x x x 
Rabia 
         x x  x x x 
Hebba 
            x   
Sumayya
h 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Nader 
x  x x   x x x x x x x x  
Suheil 
   x   x    x   x x 
Key: Political activities taken part in during the past 24 months 
V = Voting; HP = Holding public office or a formal position in a political party or interest group; 
MPP = Being a member of a political party or interest group; PM = Attending a political meeting 
or a public meeting; RM = Giving or helping to raise money for a candidate, party, or political 
cause; CT = Contributing time to a political campaign; PO = Contacting a public official or 
political leader; PR = Attending a demonstration or a protest rally; PD = Participating in a 
political discussion on line; FA = Joining a Facebook political or protest group; SP = Signing a 
petition on paper or on line; WB = Wearing a button or putting a sticker on a personal item; WL 
= Writing a letter to an editor or writing an opinion piece for a newspaper or a blog; IP = 
Initiating a political discussion in person; AT = Attempting to talk another person into voting a 
certain way. 
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